South Carolina Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 2

Article 2

Winter 1987

Thoughts on Borrowing Federal Securities Jurisprudence Under
the Uniform Securities Act
Martin C. McWilliams Jr.
University of South Carolina

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Thoughts on Borrowing Federal Securities Jurisprudence Under the Uniform
Securities Act, 38 S. C. L. Rev. 243 (1987).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

McWilliams: Thoughts on Borrowing Federal Securities Jurisprudence Under the

SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME

38

WINTER

1987

NUMBER

2

THOUGHTS ON BORROWING FEDERAL
SECURITIES JURISPRUDENCE UNDER
THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
MARTIN C. MCWILLIAMS, JR.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The South Carolina Uniform Securities Act (SCUSA), 1 enacted in 1961, has substantial implications for those conducting
their affairs within its jurisdictional reach; it is complex and in
some respects obscure. In addition, virtually no aids to its construction are available. This situation is as troublesome to the
courts as it is to those seeking to comply with the terms of the
Act. The South Carolina courts have sought help from the federal cases. As the South Carolina Court of Appeals has expressed
it, "In construing the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act,
our courts look for guidance to cases interpreting the federal [securities regulation] statute."2 The purpose of this Article is to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A.,
1969, University of Virginia; J.D., 1975, University of Mississippi; LL.M., 1976, Harvard
University.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (1976).
2. McGaha v. Mosley, 283 S.C. 268, 273, 322 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1984) (citing Bradley
v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486 (1978)). Strictly speaking, Bradley stands for a
more limited proposition. In Bradley the South Carolina Supreme Court decided that in
construing a Uniform Act provision which had been "taken almost verbatim from [a
provision of] the Securities Act of 1933," cases interpreting that federal law provision,
"while not binding authority in this Court, are looked to for guidance in interpreting the
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consider this proposition and its implications for the application
of the SCUSA.
Many provisions of the SCUSA are textually similar to provisions of federal securities regulation statutes.3 In some cases
these similar provisions were borrowed from earlier blue sky
laws for the federal statute. In other cases the blue sky laws borrowed provisions from the federal statute. This shared heritage,
culminating in similarly worded4 provisions, inclines us to construe such provisions similarly.

The Uniform Securities Act (Uniform Act),5 which was the

model for the SCUSA and more than thirty other state securities statutes, 6 contains much material borrowed from the federal
securities laws.7 Professor Loss, the principal draftsman of the
Uniform Act, has written that he hoped for "interchangeability"

corresponding [Uniform Act] provision with which we are dealing." Id. at 21, 249 S.E.2d
at 494.
3. Principal reference is to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77ff (1982 &
Supp. II 1984 & Supp. III 1985) [hereinafter Securities Act], and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. 11983 & Supp. II 1984 & Supp.
III 1985) [hereinafter Exchange Act], including, in each case, the applicable rules and
regulations.
4. For example, in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the United States
Supreme Court gave "investment contract," a term found in the federal definition of
"security," see Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982); Exchange Act § 3(a)(10),
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982), the broad meaning that the term had acquired in state
blue sky usage. The Howey court observed that when Congress included "investment
contract" in the definition of "security," it "was using a term the meaning of which had
been crystallized by ... prior [state] judicial interpretation." Id. at 298 (citing State v.
Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)).
UNIF. SEc. ACT, 7B U.L.A. 515-680 (1958) (superceded 1985). For a concise
5.
description of the Uniform Securities Act, see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION,

9-12 (1983) [hereinafter

FUNDAMENTALS].

6. See 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) T 5501 (1986).
7. An example of this borrowing is the investment advisor provisions of the Uniform
Securities Act. See L. Loss & E. CowsTT, BLUE SKY LAW 241 (1958); see also S.C. CODE
ANN, §§ 35-1-1220 to -1230. Securities Exchange Commission rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1986), was the model for the securities fraud provision of the Act, see S.C.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-1210 (1976), but the implied private right of action under rule 10b-5
was not intended to be carried over, see L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECUmTIES ACT, at 6-8 (1976) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]. The broad definition of fraud, see S.C.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(4) (1976), "codifies holdings that 'fraud' as used in federal and state
securities statutes, as well as the federal mall fraud statute, is not limited to common-law
deceit." COMMENTARY, supra, at 3. Other important definitions were modeled on their
federal counterparts, for example, "issuer", "person, sale," "offer," and "security." See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20 (1976); COMMENTARY, supra, at 99-108. For further examples of
Act provisions modeled on federal ones and for an understanding of the relative closeness of the modeling, see generally COMMENTARY, supra.
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between state and federal precedent in certain areas.8 In the
case of the SCUSA, "interchangeability," as a practical matter,
means one-way borrowing by state courts. There is vastly more
judicial and academic gloss upon the federal statutes than upon
the South Carolina statute. Consequently, there is more opportunity and temptation to borrow from the federal statute.
Borrowing can be beneficial because it keeps South Carolina
securities law up-to-date and engrafts learning and erudition
upon the State's relatively sparse securities jurisprudence. Such
borrowing also serves substantial "inclusive" 9 interests in uniformity among state schemes of securities regulation and in coordination (that is, minimization of conflict) with the federal
scheme. Nevertheless, pursuit of the goals of convenience and
uniformity should not, without analysis, subsume other, "exclusive" state values and interests. If employed mechanically as a
rule of construction, wholesale borrowing can become a substitute for analysis. Wholesale borrowing is dangerous when borrowed material proceeds from an analytical basis different from
that which underlies the local law. 10 It is a familiar idea in the
law that a word can have different meanings according to the
purpose underlying its use." Accordingly, although the borrowing of the construction of similarly worded statutes may be useful, a consideration of the appropriateness of the basis for that
construction in terms of local values and interests must accompany statutory borrowing by state courts. 1 2 A consideration of

8. E.g., COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 147.
9. This term is liberally borrowed from Professor McDougal's comprehensive interest analysis relating to conflict of laws. It refers to the propriety of decisionmaking by
one state based upon values that are not peculiar to that state but in respect of which all
of the states are interdependent. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELix, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, at 322-24 (1982).
10. See, e.g., People v. Terranova, 38 Colo. App. 476, 480, 563 P.2d 363, 366 (1977)
(federal authorities are "highly persuasive" to the extent that "the purposes and provisions of our statute parallel those of the federal enactments").
11. "Congress itself has cautioned that the same words may take on a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws." SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 465-66 (1969); see, e.g., United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849, reh'g
denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975) (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459 (1892)); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943);
Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1174 (S.D. Iowa 1981) ("any ambiguous language
contained in the blue sky laws must be construed to effect the primary purpose of such
laws"); Thiel v. Taurus Drilling Ltd., 710 P.2d 33, 37 (Mont. 1985).
12. "This court will construe the provisions of the state statute 'not in total disre-
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appropriateness of borrowing federal jurisprudence for the
SCUSA requires inquiry into the purposes of the SCUSA, which

follows.
II. PURPOSES AND POLICIES UNDERLYING THE SCUSA
The starting point in determining legislative intent is the
plain language of the statute.1 3 The words of the SCUSA leave

little doubt that its fundamental purpose is the protection of

those who invest or are invited to invest in securities. 14 How are
the provisions of the Act to be implemented to accomplish this
purpose? How broad in scope is the statute meant to be? Is it
primarily penal in nature, or is it regulatory, or is it meant to
provide compensatory and restitutionary remedies? One could
ask many similar questions. The identification of some unifying
theme of implementation of the Act would promote harmonious
and predictable answers to such questions.
The Legislature provided no express guidance to the inter-

gard of federal interpretations of identical language, but with reference to the wisdom of
adopting those interpretations for our state.'" State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, 52 Haw. 642,
647 n.2, 485 P.2d 105, 108 n.2 (1971) (quoting State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n.2, 433
P.2d 593, 597 n.2 (1967)); see also Diamond v. LaMotte, 709 F.2d 1419, 1423 (11th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 716 F.2d 914 (11th Cir. 1983) (federal court declined to construe Georgia
state securities law provision following parallel federal law provision for lack of indication that such borrowing was appropriate).
13. Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 F.2d 1490, 1496 (8th Cir. 1984) (plain
language is "best" but must be read in light of statutory purposes and objectives); see
also Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985), in which Justice Powell
stated, "It is axiomatic that '[T]he starting point in every case involving construction of
a statute is the language itself."' (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
14. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-50 (1976) (requiring approval by the Securities
Commissioner of securities sales and advertising literature); id. § 35-1-160 (making unlawful any false or misleading statements in documents filed with the Commissioner); id.
§ 35-1-330 (power of Commissioner to revoke certain exemptions from registration); id.
§§ 35-1-410 to -620 (registration and regulation of brokers, dealers and investment advisers); id. § 35-1.810 (requirement of registration of nonexempt offerings and securities);
id. § 35-1-1010 (grounds for issuance of stop order by Commissioner, including insufficient or inadequate disclosure, tendency of the stopped offering to "work a fraud upon
purchasers," or unreasonable promoter's commissions or profits); id. § 35-1-1210 (making
unlawful fraud or material misstatements or omissions in the "offer, sale or purchase of
any security"); id. § 35-1-1220 (making unlawful deceptive advertising of securities); id. §
35-1-1490 (private action for buyers of securities); id. § 35-1-1580 (powers of Commissioner and Attorney General to institute criminal proceedings founded upon SCUSA
violations).
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pretation of the SCUSA. Courts construing South Carolina law
have never been called upon to take a considered view of the
purposes of the Act. 15 Therefore, one must look elsewhere for
material from which to establish a framework for analysis. This
Article discusses three sources of such material: (1) the historical
basis of state securities regulation, including the doctrine of
merit regulation which underlies the SCUSA; (2) the goals addressed by the draftsmen of the Uniform Act, the model for the
SCUSA; and (3) judicial construction of other states' versions of
the Uniform Act. These sources are useful both in seeking a general theme of implementation of the Act and in interpreting particular provisions of the Act.
A.

Some General Background

The general purpose of the SCUSA-the protection of those
who invest or are invited to invest in securities-is the same as
that underlying the federal securities laws.16 In that case, why

15. See Kosnoski v. Bruce, 669 F.2d 944, 946 (4th Cir. 1982) (court said definition of
"security" is "broad, encompassing almost every conceivable investment scheme," without further discussion of purpose of Act); Carver v. Blanford, 288 S.C. 309, 342 S.E.2d
406 (1986) (no discussion of purpose of Act); O'Quinn v. Beach Assocs., 272 S.C. 95, 10506, 249 S.E.2d 734, 739 (1978) (no discussion of purpose of Act); McGaha v. Mosley, 283
S.C. 268, 273, 322 S.E.2d 461, 464 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Since the securities laws are remedial in nature, they should be liberally construed to protect investors."). But see Freeman v. Campbell, No. 83-CP-10-2867, at 7 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pleas, Final Order of July 6,
1985). In Freeman the trial court stated, "The apparent purpose of this extensive regulation is to let everyone make informed decisions when dealing in securities, to make the
accumulation of capital relatively easy by assuring investors of basic protections, and to
prevent persons entrusted with other people's money from taking advantage of that trust
....

' I d.

16. The Supreme Court stated as follows:
The primary purpose of the [Securities] Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to
eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. The focus
of the Acts is on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the
interest of investors.
United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); see also, e.g., Smith v. State,
266 Ark. 861, 864, 587 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 705 (1980)
(purpose of Uniform Securities Act is the same as that of the federal securities laws, i.e.,
"to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to
informed investment decisions"); cf. FuwDmNTrAr~s, supra note 6, at 6-7; Report on
State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAw. 785, 791-95 (1986) [hereinafter Merit Regulation Report].
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have two sets of laws?"7 This question was addressed in the floor
debates accompanying the passage of the federal securities regulation statutes.18 The record of those debates indicates there are
at least two reasons for having two sets of laws regulating securities, one historical and one theoretical. State blue sky laws were
the first securities regulation measures adopted in this country.
By 1933 every state had such a law. Application of these state
laws was constrained by the limits of state legislative and judicial jurisdiction. The federal securities laws were designed to
regulate transactions in interstate commerce that was in many
cases already regulated within state jurisdiction. 20 This is the
historical reason for having two sets of laws based on a similar
general purpose.
The theoretical reason for having two sets of laws lies in the
fact that the federal laws embody a theory of enforcement different than that of most state laws, including those based upon
the Uniform Act. 21 Because of this difference, judicial gloss can-

not be borrowed without comparing the two laws. The next subsection discusses this difference.
B. Merit Regulation Versus Disclosure
The nature of the federal scheme of securities regulation,

borrowed from the English pattern, 22 is informational.2 3 Its es17. The set of offerings to which the "two sets of laws" would apply in a registration
context is not coextensive. For example, offerings by issuers listed on a national securities exchange are exempt from registration under the Uniform Act. See S.C. CODE ANN.
H§ 35-1-310(7) (1976). See generally Merit Regulation Report, supra note 16, at 796-97.
The securities so offered, however, are not exempt from the antifraud and broker-dealer
provisions of the Act. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-310 to -320 (1976). The Securities
Commissioner may by order revoke such exemptions. See id. § 35-1-330.
18. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SEcurrIEs ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 2931, 2947-49, 2983 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar comp. 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

19. Every state had a securities regulation statute before 1933, when the first federal
securities regulation statute was enacted. See BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 7, at 17.

20. See Warren, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REV. 495 (1984), and authority cited therein.
21. Professors Cowett and Loss state that "the rationale is clearly different at the
federal and state levels." BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 7, at 37.
22. See L. Loss, 1 SECURriES REGULAT ON 3 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter SECURITIES
REGULATION].

23. The "fundamental purpose" of the federal securities laws is "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high
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sential requirement is complete and correct disclosure, which is
intended to permit the investor to protect himself by the exercise of his informed judgment.24 As Justice White noted, "[O]nce
full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of
the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the [federal
securities laws]. 25 To promote complete and correct disclosure,
antifraud devices are placed in the hands of federal agencies, restricted classes of injured investors employing express private
rights of action, and, in limited circumstances, injured investors
employing implied private rights of action. Private rights of action under the federal statutes have been construed to be primarily in the nature of supplemental public enforcement, rather
than a method of compensation for the injured investor. 26 The
existence of causes of action in favor of private parties, and
standing of private parties, is accordingly limited. In short, the
federal law is regulatory in nature, not compensatory; and its
regulatory aim is full and fair disclosure enabling the investing
public to exercise informed judgment.
Traditional state securities laws, too, are regulatory, not
compensatory, in nature. State securities laws, however, traditionally have been much more paternalistic than the federal
ones. The goal of the federal securities laws is the prohibition of
the offering of unsound securities. To this end, state securities
administrators inquire into the bona fides and fairness of terms
of offerings proffered for registration. 28 These regulators seek to

standard of business ethics in the securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
24. "Show up the roguery and it is harmless." FuNDA.imTALxs, supra note 5, at 35

(quoting The Times, July 4, 1844).
25. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
27. Limitations in the scope of federal securities regulation concomitantly broaden
the role of state regulation and remedies, through statutory and case law. Cf. FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 5, at 899.
28. "The primary difference between the state and federal registration is the power
of the state securities administrator to review the merits of the investment." T. HAZEN,
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 222 (1985). Under the South Carolina version of the
Uniform Securities Act, the Securities Commissioner has broad discretion to issue a stop
order in respect of any offering regardless of the provision under which it was registered.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1010 (1976). Such discretion of blue sky administrators has
withstood attack on federal preemption grounds. See, e.g., North Star Int'l v. Arizona
Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1983). See generally SEcuRIrrms REGULATION,

supra note 22, at 34, 57-61 (2d ed. 1961).
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protect the unsophisticated investor (at least in the most extreme cases) from the possibility of the adverse results of his
2 by substitution of the judgment of the seown bad judgmentV9
curities administrator. 30 The administrator can exercise his judgment either to prohibit the offering altogether or to rewrite the
terms of the offering to be more favorable to the prospective investor.3 1 This pattern of regulation
is usually called "merit re'32
view" or "merit regulation.

According to the American Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, "The first goal of merit
regulation is to ensure fair treatment of the public investor by
the promoters of the corporation.""3 Merit regulation is oriented
toward offerings; particularly, the fairness of the terms of offerings and the risk posed to the investor in light of benefits to the
promoter. This protection is meant collaterally to promote in34
vestor confidence in the securities markets.

29. For example, the purported purpose of the Michigan Uniform Securities Act is
"to prevent stockholders and promoters from perpetrating frauds and impositions on
unsuspecting investors. . . and to protect credulous and incompetent persons from their
own inclination to speculate in hazardous enterprises." Fred J. Schwaemmle Constr. Co.
v. Department of Commerce, 420 Mich. 66, 67, 360 N.W.2d 141, 146 (1984) (quoting
People v. Breckinridge, 81 Mich. App. 6, 14-15, 263 N.W.2d 922, 926 (1978)). "Blue sky
laws have as their primary purpose the suppression of fraudulent practices and the protection of the public from their own gullibility." Gaudin v. Haberman, 644 P.2d 159, 164
(Wyo. 1982) (construing the Uniform Securities Act as adopted in Wyoming, see Wyo.
STAT. §§ 17-4-101 to -129 (1977)).
30. See BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 19, at 37. The Uniform Act contains disclosure
requirements, but these were intended by the draftsmen to "supply enough information
to enable the [State] Administrator to apply the stop-order standards." COMMENTARY,
supra note 7, at 44; see BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 7, at 37. On the other hand, "the SEC
cannot routinely and directly force the kind of substantive restructuring that [merit regulation] states can." Merit Regulation Report, supra note 16, at 823.
31. Merit Regulation Report, supra note 16, at 823.
32. For a concise history of merit regulation, see id. at 791-94. For a discussion of
the nature and relative advantages and burdens of merit regulation, see id. at 795-852.
33. Merit Regulation Report, supra note 16, at 824. For a discussion of the "Uniform [Securities] Act's solution of the merit question," see generally id. at 808 n.136. The
discussion concludes that the Act "contemplates a merit authority both specifically
stated and limited in extent. The message to the administrator is restraint. The statute
contemplates the use of objective merit criteria, rather than reliance on the administrator's sense of what is fair and fitting. A statute that tracks the Uniform [Securities] Act
and contains no fair, just and equitable language cannot be used to support a regulatory
system in which finite, objective merit standards do not predominate." Id. at 809 n.136.
34. Professor Loss views the Uniform Securities Act as "not fundamentally a disclosure statute like the Securities Act of 1933," but considers the disclosure requirements of
the Act to serve a valuable back-up function to merit regulation. See COMMENTARY,
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Registration and disclosure provisions of merit regulation
statutes, such as those in the SCUSA, may be similar in appearance to federal requirements. Their purpose, however, is different: they are directed toward the exercise of the judgment of the
securities administrator.3 5 Investor self-protection is only a secondary goal.,"
In the congressional debates accompanying the passage of
the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 7 proponents of merit
regulation gave two reasons why it was the superior theory of
securities regulation. First, investors were considered incapable
of protecting themselves from the wiles of the securities salesman.38 Second, remedies were a problem: issuers of unsound securities frequently were not amenable to judgment by the time
an unsophisticated investor became aware of his injury.39 Presumably, these were among the reasons why so many states had
adopted merit regulation statutes by 1933 and retain them today.40 Additionally, it is often unrealistic to believe that small
investors understand or rely upon required disclosures, although
at the federal level disclosure is designed for investor protection
and to provide a basis for fraud claims. 41 Furthermore, in retroactive fraud actions founded upon disclosure deficiencies are
often too expensive to be of practical use to the small investor.42
For all of these reasons, merit regulation blue sky laws do not
rely on fraud-related remedies to protect or make whole the injured investor. 43 Indeed, their genesis was in the failure of fraud

supra note 8, at 84.

35. As an illustration, the Securities Commissioner can issue a stop order in his discretion in respect of any offering regardless of provision under which it was registered.
See S.C. CODE ANN.§ 35-1-110 (1976). Professor Loss views the Uniform Securities Act
as "not fundamentally a disclosure statute like the Securities Act of 1933," but considers
the Act's disclosure requirements to serve a valuable back-up function to merit review.
See CoM EmNTARY, supra note 7, at 84.
36. The Uniform Securities Act is a blend of three philosophies of regulation: merit
review, full disclosure, and antifraud. See BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 7, at 238-43. The
merit component is the predominant philosophy because substantial discretion is placed
in the administrator.
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77ff (1982 & Supp. II 1984 & Supp. 1m 1985).
38. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 1934, 2931, 2947-49, 2983.
39. See id.
40. See Merit Regulation Report, supra note 16, at 827-28.
41. See id. at 830.
42. See id. at 828; Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 904 (1982).
43. This is illustrated by the extremely limited private causes of action created by
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actions as a suitable remedial device in the securities context.

The thrust of merit regulation is to prevent unfair offerings in
the first instance, either through administrative action or by an
in terrorem effect.44 This has a substantial impact upon private

remedies available under the SCUSA. 45
In short, the federal securities laws and merit-regulation
blue sky laws proceed from differing views of the investor and
from differing views of the function of government. 6 Discussion
of these differences was an element of the floor debates preceding the passage of the Securities Act 4 7 and they were explicitly

given scope in the federal securities statutes.48 In some circumstances, these differences render unsatisfactory the borrowing
from one statutory scheme to interpret the other.
The SCUSA is primarily a merit regulation statute. We
must assume that the Legislature purposefully adopted such a
statute. Thus, when construing the statute, one must take into
account its paternalistic, market-regulatory character.

the Uniform Act. For example, S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490 (1976) creates a right of action in cases of statutory violations or deceit for buyers against their sellers and
prescribes as remedies rescission or, if the securities have been unsold, damages. Injured
sellers or other persons injured in connection with securities transactions must rely on
common-law fraud and other such state-law actions if they cannot meet federal securities
fraud requirements for standing or establishing a cause of action. This was the clear
intention of the draftsmen of the Uniform Securities Act. See, e.g., COMMENTARY, supra
note 7, at 7-8; infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Merit Regulation Report, supra note 16, at 824-30. This is not
intended as a defense of merit regulation, but as a description. For a view of the disadvantages of merit regulation, see id. at 831-43. The report observes that merit regulation
works best when market forces will not establish a balance of fairness between promoter
and investor, particularly in connection with small first-time or one-of-a-kind offerings.
It works least well as protection against the promoter who, through ignorance or bad
motive, ignores the statute altogether. In these cases, merit regulation is "no substitute
for a strong system of private antifraud remedies." Id. at 843.
45. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
46. The power of the merit regulator "is different in both kind and degree from the
SEC's. It contemplates the state acting on behalf of investors as a negotiator of terms."
Merit Regulation Report, supra note 16, at 823; see Warren, supra note 20, at 528-32.

See generally FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 5, at 29-38.
47. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 2930-32, 2947-50.
48. See Securities Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1982 & Supp. II 1984 & Supp. III 1985);
Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982); see also BLuE SKY LAW, supra note 7,
at 237 n.1. The resulting dual system of securities regulation has survived constitutional
review. See, e.g., Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux
Fall Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
These cases are known collectively as the Blue Sky Cases.
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C. Intentions of the Draftsmen of the Uniform Act
In construing versions of the Uniform Act, courts often give
weight to the intentions of those who drafted and promulgated
the Act.49 This theory of construction is reasonable, especially in
the absence of legislative history, because one may fairly assume
that a legislature is aware of draftsmen's published intentions
when it adopts an essentially prefabricated piece of legislation,
such as the Uniform Act. Thus, absent contrary legislative expressions, one may consider legislators to be endorsing the goals
of the draftsmen. Furthermore, when a legislature adopts a statutory scheme in relatively complete form, as was the SCUSA,
the draftsmen's views are valuable indicators of the intended operation of the statutory mechanism50
The Uniform Act was drafted under the auspices of, and
promulgated by, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. 51 With respect to the Act, at least three of
the Conference's goals are discernible: uniformity among state
schemes and coordination with the federal scheme of securities
regulation; a principally merit-regulation philosophy; 52 and a
market-regulatory, rather than compensatory, concept.
1. Uniformity and Coordination
The Uniform Act contains its own expression of statutory
policy: "This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of
this act with the related federal regulation." 53 Professor Loss has
49. See, e.g., Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1980); IDS
Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Michigan, 533 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1976); Goodman
v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 680-81 (D. Md. 1975).
50. See Data Access Sys. v. State Bureau of Sec., 63 N.J. 15, 305 A.2d 427 (1973)
(action requiring construction of New Jersey version of Uniform Securities Act, which
denied motion to suppress "extrinsic materials," including Professor Loss' views concerning interpretation of the Act).
51. See COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 165.
52. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
53. UNIF. SEc. AcT § 415, 7B U.L.A. 678 (1958). This is the standard policy provision
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See COMMENTARY,
supra note 7, at 165. Courts interpreting versions of the Uniform Securities Act have
given weight to this statement of purpose. See, e.g., Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank,
737 F.2d 1490, 1496 (8th Cir. 1984) (construing a version of the Act that, like the South
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pointed out the need for national uniformity of the law is nowhere greater than in the area regulating the securities markets. 54 Uniformity benefits the states by permitting "an interchangeability of precedent and practice" among the states, while
minimizing burdens on legitimate interstate business.5 5 The securities markets are increasingly efficient, timing and rapidity of
transactions are increasingly important commercial values, and
novel and sophisticated investment schemes are rife.5" Consequently, the need for uniformity is growing. The promulgation of
the Uniform Act was a conscious effort to address to this need.57
It has been enacted in some form in at least thirty-nine states.5"
A state does not achieve uniformity simply by enacting similarly
worded statutes. Differing interpretations by courts or by securities administrators can result in divergent construction of similarly worded statutes in different states. 59 Accordingly, Uniform
Act states make an effort to interpret their laws in similar ways,
insofar as this is not inconsistent with subjective state interests.60 Courts in Uniform Act states are able to look to germane
decisions in other such states and to give weight to such decisions for the sake of uniformity as well as for their qualities of
persuasiveness.
In expressing their intentions with respect to the relationship between the federal and state securities laws, the draftsmen
of the Uniform Act did not use the term "uniformity." They
wrote of "coordination," by which they meant minimizing conflicts between the two bodies of law."' This is quite different

Carolina version, does not include § 415); People v. Dempster, 96 Mich. 700, 704, 242
N.W.2d 381, 384 (1976).
54. See, e.g., BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 7, at 230.
55. Id. at 238.
56. See generally Merit Regulation Report, supra note 16, at 794-95.
57. See generally BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 7, at 230-31.
58. See 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1 5500 (1986).
59. See, e.g., BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 7, at 44; Merit Regulation Report, supra
note 16, at 789.
60. See, e.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center., 52 Haw. 642, 647 n.2, 485 P.2d 105, 108
n.2 (1971); Pratt v. Kross, 276 Or. 483, 555 P.2d 765 (1976).
61. In his treatise on blue sky law, Professor Loss stated as follows:
The only hope for simplification lies in uniformity [of state laws] and federal-state coordination .... [S]tate administration will benefit from an act
which is reasonably coordinated with the federal legislation, as well as uniform
from state to state, in that it will not only help legitimate interstate business
but also facilitate an interchangeability of precedent and practice.
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from uniformity, and the difference stems from the differing interests served by, and theories of regulation of, the two bodies of
law.6 2 In other words, neither uniformity nor coordination provides a basis for construing a state statute to have an identical
meaning as a similar federal statute. As a regulatory goal, coordination is intended to enhance the smooth functioning of the
national securities market," In addition, minimizing conflict
with the federal securities regulation scheme rebuffs arguments
for federal preemption of state securities laws.6
Uniformity and coordination, at their most potent, are no
more than policy. To exalt them above legitimate, subjective
state interests, without analysis, would be questionable, particularly if the result were the adoption of federal jurisprudence proceeding from a theoretical basis which, in some respects, is inconsistent with that of the SCUSA.
2. Regulatory Versus Compensatory Orientation
The Uniform Act offers a three-pronged regulatory framework: registration of offerings, registration of market professionals, and antifraud. A fourth section of the Act contains provisions of general applicability, such as definitions. The intention
of the draftsmen was for each adopting state to adopt the general section, promoting uniformity in these generally applicable
provisions, and to adopt one or more of the three regulatory sections. At least among those states adopting a particular regulatory section, uniformity would be promoted.'
The "fraud" contemplated by the Act's antifraud provisions
is not common-law fraud. Federal and state securities regulation
statutes have created a statutory wrong related to common-law
deceit, but lacking the focusing characteristics of the commonlaw action, such as the requirements of privity, reliance, and
LAW, supra note 7, at 238.
62. The Uniform Securities Act "had to be coordinated with the federal legislation,
but not at the price of relegating the state statutes to a subordinate position ....
[M]ost of the existing state laws go beyond the disclosure philosophy of the federal act."
Id. at 237.
63. Professor Loss observes, "An intelligent and workable system of federalism requires that the states cooperate in reducing to a minimum the burden of their separate
legislation on interstate commerce." Id. at 238.
64. See generally Warren, supra note 20.
65. See BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 7, at 236-38.
BLUE SKY
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causation. 6 It would have been possible, although perhaps technically difficult, to base general compensatory remedies upon
this special "securities fraud." Congress, however, drafted the
federal statutes to include only carefully limited private causes
of action designed to assist public enforcement, which are too
limited in nature to be characterized as compensatory. An agonizing evolution of highly technical and confusing limitations
now accompanies judicial recognition under the federal statutes
of wider, implied private rights of action. The Uniform Act, like
the text of the federal statutes, lacks any general compensatory
cause of action for investors injured by securities fraud. The
draftsmen of the Uniform Act recognized the confusion of courts
construing the federal securities statute and expressly intended
that the Act imply no private civil cause of action. Accordingly,
the sanctions for violations of the antifraud provisions of the Act
are almost exclusively market-regulatory in nature-injunction,
administrative proceedings, and criminal prosecution. 7 The sole
exception is the availability of rescission to buyers whose sellers
violated the Act in some way.6 8 Even this provision is essentially
regulatory in nature, simply constituting the undoing of a
wrongful sale. The rescission action will lie for negligence. The
buyer/plaintiff in such an action need not show injury. Thus, rescission deprives the violator of his bargain. The wronged
buyer's only remedy is restoration of his prepurchase condition,
since consequential damages are unavailable. The Act does not
provide even this limited right of action for wronged sellers.6 9

66. Compare Securities Act §§ 11, 12, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q (1982) and
Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) and UNIF. SEc. ACT § 410(a), 7B U.L.A.
643 (1958) with W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
67. See UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 407, 408, 409, 7B U.L.A. 625, 628, 631.
68. See id. § 410(a), 7B U.L.A. 643.
69. This lack of symmetry is explained by Professor Loss in the draftsmen's commentary to the Uniform Securities Act. It is partly historical: the blue sky laws traditionally have been directed toward regulating sellers, protecting against unfair offerings in
the first instance. It is partly theoretical: the states have existing actions contemplating
fraud and misrepresentation which are available to redress injury. The federal law had
none; therefore, the lack of such actions was made up by implication. Professor Loss'
view is that comprehensive securities fraud remedies should not displace existing and
developing state remedies. In other words, the Uniform Securities Act is intended to
regulate the securities market, not displace fraud actions under state law. See COMmENTARY, supra note 7, at 7-8. Of course, a state may add buyer protections to its version of
the Uniform Securities Act. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 1-101 to -704 (Purdon
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The draftsmen's comments and this pattern of remedies
under the Uniform Act illustrate two characteristics of the Act.
One characteristic is the orientation of the Act toward offerings
of securities, not toward the secondary market, in which sellers
are as likely as buyers to be victims of securities fraud. The
other characteristic is the market-regulatory orientation, as opposed to any compensatory orientation, of the Act. The Act does
not provide an avenue for litigation for those alleging injury
from securities fraud.70 In other words, the Act does not establish securities fraud as a private wrong. It is a public wrong and
the remedy is designed as a means of enforcement of a regulatory statute. This is congruent with the Act's paternalistic character, focusing on public policing of the market and attempting
to prevent injudicious offerings in the first instance.
D. Decisions Construing Other Versions of the Uniform Act
In construing the SCUSA, decisions interpreting other
states' versions of the Uniform Act are important for two reasons. One is to serve the policy of uniformity among the states.
The other is that such decisions relate to statutes doctrinally related to the SCUSA. The theory of enforcement of these statutes
is presumptively similar to ours and the decisions are correspondingly persuasive. This view is widely held.71
Therefore, it is useful to review what courts in other states
have said about the purposes of the Uniform Act. As noted previously, there is agreement that courts should liberally interpret
the Act to achieve its remedial purpose. 72 Beyond this, the preSupp. 1986). A state also may delete provisions in the Uniform Securities Act that prohibit implication of private civil actions. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 292.530 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1981); see also Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7, 10-12 (6th Cir. 1980).
70. Such plaintiffs should seek their right of action in common-law fraud or conversion, or, in appropriate cases, violation of fiduciary duties. When the wrong is perpetrated in an anonymous market, such as a securities exchange, these state causes of action may not be available because of lack of privity or some other requirement, but
federal rights of action may be available. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 778, 552 S.W.2d 4,
9 (1977); Department of Commerce v. DeBeers Diamond Inv., 89 Mich. App. 406, 410,
280 N.W.2d 547, 550 (1979); People v. Dempster, 51 Mich. App. 612, 616, 216 N.W.2d 81,
82-83 (1974); State v. Russell, 119 N.J. Super. 344, 347, 291 A.2d 583, 585 (1972).

72. But see People v. Lyons, 93 Mich. App. 35, 44, 285 N.W.2d 788, 792 n.6 (1979)
("[L]iberality of construction should not include stretching the language of the [Michigan Uniform Securities Act, MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.501-.818 (West 1967 & Supp.
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ponderance of decisions indicates that the protections of the
Uniform Act are oriented toward protecting offerees and buyers
of securities. 73 This reading of the Act is consistent with its nature as a merit regulation statute. It is also consistent with the
Act's primary focus on first-time and one-of-a-kind offerings and
its emphasis upon the "seasoning" of securities.
E. Summary
Similarity of words alone is an inadequate, even dangerous,
basis for borrowing gloss from the informationally oriented federal securities laws to inform our own merit regulation statute.
The temptation is great because borrowing is easy and because
it serves a perceived policy of uniformity. On the other hand, if
similar provisions serve similar purposes within the two
schemes, borrowing may sometimes be indulged with beneficial
results. To illustrate these ideas, the following sections contain
discussions of two volatile areas of the law in which borrowing
federal law to aid in interpreting the SCUSA would be tempting
because of statutory verbal similarity, complexity of issues, and
the existence of a substantial amount of analysis at the federal
level: the meaning of "security" and implied private rights of
action.

1986)] to encompass evils not addressed within the statutory purpose").
73. See, e.g., Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1174 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (the "primary purpose" of blue sky laws "is to protect the public from deceit perpetrated in the
sale of securities") (citing Midwest Management Corp. v. Shepers, 291 N.W.2d 896, 901
(Iowa 1980)); Upton v. Trinidad Petroleum Corp., 468 F. Supp. 330, 335 (N.D. Ala. 1979)
(purpose is "for the general welfare and to protect the public from diversified methods of
deceit and fraud in the sale of securities") (quoting Uniform Securities Act, 1 Blue Sky
L. Rep. 1021); Hardtke v. Love Tree Corp., 386 F. Supp. 1085, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
("The Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the broad purpose underlying the Wisconsin Securities Law is the protection of the public from the sale of worthless securities"); Fred J. Schwaemmle Constr. Co. v. Department of Commerce, 420
Mich. 66, 77, 360 N.W.2d 141, 146 (1984); Dunn v. Bemor Petroleum, Inc., 680 S.W.2d
304, 306 (Mo. App. 1984) (state securities law drafted "to prevent fraud in the sale of
securities"); Garbo v. Hilleary Franchise Sys., 479 S.W.2d 491, 499 (Mo. App. 1972)
("[P]rimary purpose . . . is protecting buyers of securities"); Higgins v. New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 100 N.J. Super. 266, 271-72, 241 A.2d 660, 663 (App. Div. 1968) (protecting
the "buying public"). But see Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 940
(D.N.J. 1978) (purpose is to protect buyers and sellers); CoMrENTARY, supra note 7, at 7.
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III.

APPROPRIATE BORROWING: "SECURITY"

An example of an area of securities law generally appropriate for borrowing is the definition of "security." This follows
from the similarity between the general purposes of the federal
and state statutes, juxtaposed with the jurisdictional nature of
the definition. Additionally, the draftsmen of the Uniform Act
borrowed much of the wording of the federal definition. 4 Courts
in Uniform Act jurisdictions have generally accepted the guidance of the substantial federal precedent in construing their own
states' definition of "security.

' 75

In a few cases, however, strong

subjective state interests led state courts to give broader meaning to statutory terminology than had been given in federal decisions.7 6 There are indications that the federal courts may be following these state court decisions-borrowing in the less usual
direction.
A.

Purpose Plus JurisdictionalScope

As already noted, the general purpose of the SCUSA and
the federal securities laws is the same: protection of investors in
securities by regulation of the securities markets. As this brief
statement implies, the concept of "security" is jurisdictional in a
fundamental sense. Courts at both the federal and state levels
have determined that a broad construction each statute is necessary to effect its remedial purpose.77 Therefore, each statute
must have the broadest appropriate jurisdictional reach. This
means that the concept of "security" should encompass all arrangements that implicate the protections intended by the statutes. Accordingly, despite their differing theories of enforcement, the SCUSA and the federal securities statutes share a
74. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(12) (1976) with Securities Act § 2(1), 15
U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) and Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982). Al-

though the Securities Act and Exchange Act definitions are slightly different-the Exchange Act definition does not mention "evidence of indebtedness"-they are construed
as being identical. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556
n.7 (1979).
75. See J. LONG, 1985 BLUE SKY LAw HANDBOOK §§ 2.01-.06 (1984).
76. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
77. With respect to the federal securities laws, authority for this proposition is too
numerous to merit citation. With respect to the Uniform Act, see, e.g., McGaha v. Mosley, 283 S.C. 268, 273, 322 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1984).
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general purpose from which proceeds an interest in a broad and
flexible definition of "security. 78 This sharing of purposes suggests the appropriateness of borrowing.
The term "security" is assigned to a dynamic phenomenon
possessing qualities that render it peculiarly susceptible to manipulative and deceptive practices. These qualities include the
investor's hope for gain premised, to some extent, on the effort
and expertise of another.79 Because the investor's own efforts are
not the vital ones, the medium for producing benefits is not specific to any particular investor. Therefore, the medium may be
attractive to more than one investor and have value independent
of its intrinsic capability to generate benefit.8 0 This characteristic transferability implies amenability to marketing8 and, therefore, the potential for deception in marketing and manipulation
of the market. The necessity for reliance on the capabilities of
another implies the possibility of deception about the qualities
of the risk.
These dangers are the same, whether they are being addressed by the federal laws or by the Uniform Act. Both regulatory schemes address these dangers through disclosure, but differ with regard to the objective of the disclosure. In the federal
scheme, as previously discussed, disclosure is addressed to the
investor, who exercises his own judgment concerning the merits
of the investment. Regulation protects against the wrongful inducement to make an investment decision. In the Uniform Act
scheme, the disclosure is addressed to the securities administrator who, at least in the first instance, exercises his judgment concerning the basic soundness of the investment as a matter of
78. The definition should be as broad as it needs to be to accomplish the relevant
statutory purpose. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). A dilemma
shared by the federal and state regulators is to define "security" to give sufficient scope
to the statutes without being unduly intrusive into transactions which do not fairly implicate the perceived dangers which the law seeks to address. "[L]iberality of construction should not include stretching the language of the act to encompass evils not addressed within the statutory purpose." People v. Lyons, 93 Mich. App. 35, 44 n.6, 285
N.W.2d 788, 792 n.6 (1979).
79. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
80. The stock market is the clearest example of this phenomenon. Shares of stock
gain and lose value on the basis of perceptions of value to members of a market unrelated, in most cases, to the shares' intrinsic ability to generate benefit for their holder.
81. The Comptroller of the Currency, for example, defines "investment security" as
a "marketable obligation in the form of a bond, note, or debenture. . . ." 12 C.F.R. §
1.3(b) (1986) (emphasis added).
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public interest. Regulation polices the terms of particular
offerings.
In each case, however, it is recognized that restriction of the
reach of regulation to particular known species of investment is
inappropriate.8 2 In each scheme, if the broad, remedial purposes
are to be fulfilled, the scope of regulation must be broad enough
to include the entire potential range of the subject matter
sought to be regulated. State securites regulation schemes need,
in effect, a common law of securities fraud that is sufficiently
flexible to follow developments in the securities industry and in
the imaginations of practitioners of manipulation and deception.
There are few reasons why federal and Uniform Act jurisdictions
could not share this common law. In fact, in order for regulators
to keep pace with a rapidly evolving securities market, such
sharing is probably necessary.
B.

The Draftsmen's Intentions

For their definition of "security," the draftsmen of the
SCUSA chose the wording of section 2(1) of the Securities Act, s3
with minor changes." The official comment to the Uniform Act
notes that "[s]ection 2(1) was modeled on the definition in some
of the state statutes, and the federal definition has in turn influenced many of the new state statutes 8 5 and that the definition

82. The blue sky commissioners understood the need for such flexibility quite early.
See State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920) and authorities cited therein. It was to their formulation that Congress looked in defining "security"
in the federal statutes and to which the Supreme Court looked in construing the federal
definition of "security" in United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344
(1943). For the same reason, Professor Loss "borrowed it back" for the Uniform Securities Act.
Similar recognition is reflected in the English experience and the resulting scope of
their new Investor Protection Law, proposed to replace their Protection of Fraud (Investments) Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 45 (1958). The Official Statutory Study Commission
realized that the definition of "investment" would define this scope, but noted fears that
"it was impossible to foresee what new types of investment would be invented." See
COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 106. The Commission concluded that "flexibility must and
can be built into any new legislation." L. GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION-REPoRT. PART 1 26 (1984).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1).
84. See COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 106.
85. UNIF. SEC. AcT § 410 official comment, 7B U.L.A. 583 (1958).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

262

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2

has been universally broadly construed."' A broadly applicable
definition clearly serves the interests of merit regulation, bringing the largest appropriate universe of transactions within the
scope of the securities administrator's judgment. Similarly, a
broad definition serves the market-regulatory concept by ensuring that the entire market is in fact regulated.
Borrowing in this area particularly serves the policies of
uniformity and coordination. Manifestly, it is advantageous to
investors, promoters, and regulators if something that is a security under one applicable regulatory scheme is a security under
other such schemes. This was certainly in the minds of the Uniform Act draftsmen when they borrowed the federal definition.
As a result, every Uniform Act jurisdiction has adopted a statutory definition of "security" similar to that in the federal
87
statutes.
C. Serving State Interests
Similarity of heritage, wording, and general purpose, in conjunction with values of uniformity and coordination, make the
definition of "security" possibly the best example of a provision
suitable for borrowing. Even so, complete uniformity has not
been achieved.88 The policy of uniformity has given way, in some
instances, to state interests. As an example, consider the term
"investment contract." The definition of "security" explicitly includes as securities several familiar classes of instrument, such
as shares of stock. Decisions make clear that anything termed
"shares of stock" and manifesting "'some of the significant
characteristics typically associated with' stock" is a security. 9
Other categories of security named in the definition might receive similar treatment.9 0 More complex difficulties arise in con86. Id.
87. See J. LONG, supra note 75.
88. See COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 106.
89. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985) (quoting United
Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975)). In this manner, Landreth effectively

extinguished the "sale of business" doctrine.
90. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 685-88. The opinion observes that "most instruments
bearing such a traditional title are likely to be covered by the definition," Id. at 686
(citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 650). The Landreth court, however, left open the question

whether other categories listed in the definition of "security," such as notes and bonds,
could always be shown to be securities by showing that they possess the necessary attrib-
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nection with novel devices that do not fit neatly into traditional
categories commonly regarded as securities, but which pose the
same dangers to investors as do traditional securities. To gather
such devices into the regulatory scheme, the Securities Act definition of "security" incorporated the blue sky law concept of
"investment contract."91
The United States Supreme Court construed this concept in
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 92 State law interpretations of "invest-

ment contract" frequently accepted the Howey formula.93 In
some instances, the Howey formula even served as a general definition of "security.

' 94

Courts in at least five jurisdictions, how-

ever, criticized the Howey formula as being too narrow in light
of the perceived purposes of their state blue sky laws. 5 These
decisions may reflect a state court perception that the Howey
test is too conservative to suit paternalistic, merit regulation
philosophy, or that the Howey formula is influenced by a general
narrowing of federal court securities jurisdiction. In fact, if the
Howey formula is too narrow, the fault lies not with the opinion
itself, but with the courts that have construed the wording of the
Howey formula as though it were a statute. This renders the

utes of their nominal character.
91. See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
92. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
93. In Howey the Court construed "investment contract" to mean "a contract,
transaction, or other scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party ......
Id. at 298; see also id. at 301 (restating the formula in slightly different words).
94. E.g., Long, State Securities Regulation-An Overview, 32 OKL. L. REV. 541,
559-74 (1979). As Professor Long points out, there are other tests, but the Howey test is
"by far... the most widely used [and] is the primary, if not the only, test for investment
contracts in the federal courts and enjoys wide acceptance in the state courts and administrative agencies." Id. at 560.
95. According to the Hawaii Supreme Court, "The primary weakness of the Howey
formula is that it has led courts to analyze investment projects mechanically, based on a
narrow concept of investory participation." State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, 52 Haw. 642,
647, 485 P.2d 105, 108 (1971). The Hawaii court propounded its own formula, emphasizing what it views as more flexible concepts of investment, benefit, and control by the
investor. See id. at 648-49, 485 P.2d at 109. For similar cases, see Securities Adm'r v.
College Assistance Plan (Guam) Inc., 533 F. Supp. 118, 121-22 (D. Guam App. Div.
1981), aff'd, 700 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983) (construing Guam's version of the Uniform
Securities Act, GUAM Gov'T CODE §§ 45,101-45,420 (1970)); Schultz v. Rector-PhillipsMorse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 780-81, 552 S.W.2d 4, 10 (1977) (en banc); State v. Investors
Sec. Corp., 297 Minn. 1, 11, 209 N.W.2d 405, 410 (1973); Pratt v. Kross, 276 Or. 483, 49596, 555 P.2d 765, 772 (1976). See generally Annotation, What Constitutes an "Investment Contract" Within the Meaning of State Blue Sky Laws, 47 A.L.R.3d 1375 (1973).
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Howey test the mechanical rule that the Supreme Court said in
Howey was not wanted.96 The Court has consistently emphasized the need for case-by-case analysis and flexibility, particularly when dealing with the sort of "unusual device" meant to be
contemplated by "investment contract."9
Possibly perceiving this misapplication of Howey, the Supreme Court in United Housing Foundation v. Forman"s reemphasized the flexibility of the term "investment contract."9 9 The
Court implicitly endorsed standards articulated in cases decided
under blue sky laws.100 In so doing, the Supreme Court arguably
has provided a recent example of borrowing from state law to
inform the federal law.
D.

South Carolina Jurisprudence

Courts applying the SCUSA have exhibited a uniform view
that, in construing the SCUSA's definition of "security," courts
may look to101cases interpreting the federal statutory definition of
"security."
This means that, in effect, as the federal law
evolves, South Carolina law changes too. To know their own law,
South Carolina lawyers must keep abreast of federal cases.
This gives South Carolina the considerable advantages of
borrowing. It does not mean, however, that South Carolina
courts are not free to depart from federal law constructions
when analysis indicates that to do so would better serve subjec-

96. 328 U.S. at 299.

97. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1985).
98. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).

99. Id. at 851-52.
100. See id. at 852 n.16. The Court in Forman referred to the holding in SEC v.
Glenn Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973), which stated
that the "efforts of others" must be the "undeniably significant," but not "sole" profitproducing efforts. The Court, however, found it unnecessary to address the issue to decide Forman. See 421 U.S. at 852 n.16; see also SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687
F.2d 577, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1982).
101. See, e.g., Carver v. Blanford, 288 S.C. 309, 342 S.E.2d 406 (1986) (adopting
Landreth Timber rule); O'Quinn v. Beach Assocs., 272 S.C. 95, 105-06, 249 S.E.2d 734,
739 (1978) (Howey is controlling on meaning of "investment contract"); McGaha v. Mosley, 283 S.C. 268, 273, 322 S.E.2d 461, 464 (Ct. App. 1984) (look to "cases interpreting
the federal statute" concerning definition of "security"); see also Kosnoski v. Bruce, 669
F.2d 944, 946 (4th Cir. 1982) ("We assume ...that the South Carolina Supreme Court
would adopt the Federal judicature concerning 'investment contracts.' "). These opinions
reflect acceptance by South Carolina of the Howey formula.
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tive state interests perceived as underlying the SCUSA. 10 2
IV.

INAPPROPRIATE BORROWING: PRIVATE STANDING AND

IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION

Modern securities markets, with their peculiar structure unlike anything known to the common law, give scope for activities
perceived as wrongful. The common law, however, offers no redress to individuals harmed by these activities, largely because
of the virtual impossibility of establishing any relationship between victim and perpetrator.1 0 3 This makes these markets and
their peculiar wrongs appropriate for government regulation.
When designing their regulatory schemes, the drafters of securities regulation statutes invented a statutory wrong: employment
of manipulative or deceptive practices in connection with the securities transactions ("securities fraud"). Congress made this activity unlawful precisely because it was not actionable at the
common law. Therefore, it should not too hastily be assigned
causes of action and remedies which developed in the common
law.
Implied private rights of action patterned after common-law
deceit have been found in the federal securities laws, but these
have been construed as being in the nature of aids to public enforcement and not as providing comprehensive remedies to those

who allege injury from securities fraud.10 4 The federal statutes,
102. See, e.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, 52 Haw. 642, 647, 485 P.2d 105, 108 n.2
(1971); Pratt v. Kross, 276 Or. 483, 497, 555 P.2d 765, 773 (1976).
103. "[Tlhe doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and securities." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180,
194 (1963). In an anonymous auction market such as a national securities exchange, key
elements of common-law deceit (e.g., reliance and causation) are virtually impossible to
prove. These requirements have been substantially relaxed for purposes of stating an
action under SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986), but the degree and effect of
such relaxation continue to be matters of confusion and debate. See, e.g., FUNDAMENTALS,
supra note 5, at 808-18; T. HAZEN, supra note 28, at 461-70, and authority cited therein.
See generally PROSSER & KFaTON, supra note 66, § 108, at 751.
104. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (implied
action under Exchange Act § 10(b) and SEC rule 10b-5); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964) (implied action under Exchange Act § 14(a)); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs.,
443 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978) (implied action under
Exchange Act § 12(b)); Kerber v. Kakos, 383 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (implied action under Exchange Act § 12(g)). But see, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 494 F.2d
528 (3d Cir. 1974) (no implied action under Exchange Act § 13(a)); Dyer v. Eastern
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in large part, leave the provision of comprehensive civil remedies
for such injury to state law. The principal implied civil right of
action under the federal securities laws derives from rule 10b-5
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.105 This rule was the
model for section 101 of the Uniform Act.10 6 Commentators have
noted that section 101 has the same purpose as rule 10b-5-the
prevention of securities fraud. 0 7 Section 101 is codified at South
Carolina Code section 35-1-1210.110 In other words, South Carolina has a statutory provision that, like the definition of "security," is modeled on federal law and arguably has the same general purpose as has its model. Does this mean that South
Carolina should borrow the federal implied private action of rule
10b-5 when construing section 35-1-1210? To answer that question, we must first know with more particularity the purpose for
which section 35-1-1210 was put into the SCUSA. Is it there for
market regulatory purposes-to make wrongful certain conduct
and thereby deter or punish it-or is it there to provide an avenue to redress the effects of such conduct? In other words, is
section 35-1-1210 exclusively regulatory, or compensatory as
well? It appears to be overwhelmingly regulatory, for reasons
that are discussed herein. 0 9 Those who disagree with this conclusion should carefully consider whether the body of law which
has developed under rule 10b-5 is what South Carolina needs to
serve the purpose of section 35-1-1210, and whether it is appropriate for anyone other than the legislature to provide the answer. Subjective state interests are far too important in this area
to be subjected to judicial borrowing.

Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971). See generally Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (discussion of Congressional purpose in Parts III and IV of
the opinion).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). This rule was promulgated pursuant to Exchange
Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
106. UNIF. SEC. AcT § 101 7B U.L.A. 516 (1958).

107. See Farmer & Feldman, Fraud in Securities Transactions:A Comparison of
Remedies Under the Ohio Securities Act, the Uniform Securities Act, and the Federal
Securities Acts, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 814, 821 (1980); Long, supra note 94, at 554; see also
UNIF. SEC. AcT § 101 comment, 7B U.L.A. 516 (1958).
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1210 (1976).

109. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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A.

Compensatory Remedies Under Securities Fraud Statutes

Whether the South Carolina securities market needs a compensatory securities fraud rule is beyond the scope of this Article. Should empirical study show that injury related to securities
fraud is going unredressed, one might make a strong case in
favor of such a rule. If securities fraud is a wrong, should there
not be redress for those injured by the wrong? Technical difficulties arise in tailoring remedies to injury in a compensatory
context because the conceptual scope of securities fraud is far
broader than that of common-law fraud. Framing such a law requires empirical study of the markets, careful drafting, and a
decision as to where in the law such a rule is to be found. All of
these considerations must be addressed in terms of the perceived wrong to be redressed and the purpose of the new rule.
The Legislature is best suited to address these considerations.
South Carolina Code section 35-1-1210 makes it "unlawful"
to employ any fraudulent or deceptive device in connection with
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security.110 It does not, by its
terms, create any private right of action. This alone does not
foreclose the possibility of an implied private action, however,
because of "the general principle or [sic] of tort law that violation of a provision of a criminal statute can, unless expressly or
impliedly negatived by the statute itself, give rise to a civil remedy in tort."111 In the case of section 35-1-1210, however, the
statute expressly and impliedly negatives an implied civil
remedy.
The implied negative lies in section 35-1-1490 of the
Code,1 which creates an explicit, although limited, civil remedy

110. S.C. CODE ANN.

§

35-1-1210 (1976).

111. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 765 (D. Colo. 1964).
The federal courts have developed a four-part inquiry in considering whether a federal
statute implies a private right of action: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of a class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any explicit or
implicit indication of congressional intent to create or deny the particular remedy sought
to the particular plaintiff seeking it; (3) whether the remedy sought, for the plaintiff
seeking it, is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme; and (4)
whether the action is one traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975); Liberty Nat'l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545 (11th Cir.
1984), and authority cited therein.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490 (1976).
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for buyers whose sellers have violated the Code. The presence of
this remedy implies legislative intent to exclude further private
remedies. 113 The express negative is found in South Carolina
Code section 35-1-1560,114 the codification of Uniform Act section 410(h). 115 Section 35-1-1560 provides in pertinent part:

The rights or remedies provided by this Chapter are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist at law or
in equity, but this chapter does not create any cause of action
not specified in this section or in [section] 35-1-510 [brokerdealer surety bonds in connection with registered offerings].116
The official comment to section 410(h) notes: "[M]ere presence
of certain specific liability provisions in a statute is no assurance
that other liabilities will not be implied by the courts under the
doctrine which creates a common-law tort action for violation of
certain criminal statutes." 117 Accordingly, the draftsmen of the

Uniform Act inserted the last-quoted clause of section 410(h)
"to assure that no comparable development [to the implied action under rule 10b-5] is based on violation of [section] 101 of
this Act."1 8 In addition, the commentary to section 101 of the
Uniform Act notes that neither the borrowing of rule 10b-5 jurisprudence in particular nor the creation of a private action in
general was intended under section 101.119 This commentary
makes specific reference to section 410.120

The intentions of the draftsmen of the Uniform Act are,
therefore, clear, and the Legislature adopted their statutory
structure virtually intact, without any indication that the Legislature's views differed from the published views of the draftsmen. In the absence of any other expression of legislative intent,
these circumstances may fairly be taken as an endorsement by
21
the legislature of the draftsmen's views.

113. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 883, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly,
J., concurring).
114. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1560 (1976).
115. UNIF. SEC. AcT § 410(h), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1958).
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1560.

117.

COMMENTARY,

supra note 7, at 151.

118. Id.
119. See UNIF. SEC, Ac

§ 101 comment, 7B U.L.A. 516 (1958). Professor Loss considers the latter course preferable. See COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 8.
120. See UNIF. SEc. Ac § 101 comment, 7B U.L.A. 516.
121. See Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 681-82 (D. Md. 1975). The district
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The official comment to Uniform Act section 101 observes
that the sanctions for securities fraud contemplated by that section are administrative proceedings, injunction, and criminal
prosecution, except for the very limited private civil action of
section 410(h).122 By putting the tools of enforcement of the
Uniform Act almost solely into the hands of public regulatory
authorities, the regulatory purpose of the Act is served without
interference from the complex and diverse state laws on civil
compensation and restitution. The intent of the Act is the regulation of the securities markets, not the superimposition of statutory civil actions upon existing state law. It is the ends and
means of market regulation for which uniformity and coordination are sought, not the extent to which individual states choose
to give their citizens relief once regulatory norms have been violated. The structure of the Act reflects a balance between predictability in interstate markets and interference with the civil
remedies of the individual states. Most courts that have been
asked to imply a private right of action under state law provisions based upon section 101 have declined to do so. 123 The prin-

court opined, "Inasmuch as the Maryland legislature certainly had the Commissioners'

Notes and Draftsmen's Commentary before it during its deliberations on the adoption of
sections 101 and 410 [the Uniform Securities Act bases for S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490
(1976)], its nearly verbatim acceptance of those sections must be deemed an expression
of legislative intent against the development of an implied right .of action on behalf of a
defrauded seller." Id. at 681-82. There is no indication (other than the court's supposition) that the Legislature in fact considered the Notes and Commentary).
122. COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 6. But see Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151
(7th Cir. 1980). In Cahill Judge Pell, dissenting from a decision that the Wisconsin analogue to § 101 does not imply a rule 10b-5 private action, argues that both laws are
"intended to punish intentional wrongful conduct and make the perpetrators of such
conduct liable for all the consequential damages caused by their acts." Id. at 157 (Pell,
J., dissenting). Judge Pell's argument appeared to be that consequential damages are
part of the punishment and their availability is a deterrent, but this begs the important
question of how "consequent damages" are to be calculated in a securities fraud action.
In matching relief to injury, courts administering state law must be conscious of an existing body of jurisprudence. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text. The tenor of
Judge Pell's argument is that damages for securities fraud should be compensatory in
effect (although penal in nature) but, in light of their remedial nature, should not be
constrained by the limits of available state actions comprehending compensatory remedies. Similar arguments have been made in dissents in the United States Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. See, e.g., Diamond v. LaMotte, 709 F.2d 1419, 1423 (11th Cir. 1983) (construing
Georgia's version of Uniform Securities Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-5-1 to -5-24 (1982 &
Supp. 1986)); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 17-18 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
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cipal exception is based on a state legislature's failure to enact

Uniform Act section 410(h).12 4 South Carolina enacted section
410(h).125 Thus, statutory purpose (insofar as we are able to ascertain it), the theory and design of the statute, and the weight
of authority argue against implying any private civil action
under section 35-1-1210. In addition to these factors, there are
at least two further reasons why courts construing section 35-11210 should not borrow rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. One is the

complexity and special nature of the state law of deceit and misrepresentation. The other is the peculiar body of precedent that
has developed under rule 10b-5, which has itself taken on a
strongly regulatory aspect.
1. Arguments Against Borrowing
a. Deceit and Misrepresentation
The action implied under rule 10b-5 is related to common-

1124 (1981); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 453 (3rd Cir. 1979); Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1023 n.31 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); IDS
Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Michigan Corp., 533 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1976);
Niches v. Koehler Managment Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 613 n.2 (6th Cir. 1976); Friedlander
v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 595 F. Supp. 1442, 1452 (N.D. Ga. 1984);
Margaret Hall Found. v. Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1475 (D. Mass.
1983); Colonial Bank & Trust Co. v. American Bankshares Corp., 478 F. Supp. 1186,
1189-90 (E.D. Wisc. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.
1980); Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 680-81 (D. Md. 1975); Cabot Corp. v. Baddouir, 394 Mass. 720, 723 n.3, 477 N.E.2d 399, 401 n.3 (1985); Ludwig v. Mutual Real
Estate Investors, 18 Wash. App. 33, 42-44, 567 P.2d 658, 663 (1977); see also Eacho v.
Bouvier, Civ. A. No. 83-2903 (D.D.C. May 24, 1985) (asking counsel for briefs on results
in other states and statutory history); Foster v. Jessup & Lamont Sec., 482 So. 2d 1201
(Ala. 1986) (declining to decide the issue as unnecessary to disposition of dispute). But
see Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7, 10-12 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981)
(Kentucky did not adopt Uniform Securities Act § 410(h)); Bailey v. Piper, Jaffray &
Hopwood, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 475, 481 (D. Minn. 1976) ("likely" that § 101 analogue gives
rise to an implied action).
Relatively few courts have faced the question as one dispositive of disputes. But see
Goodman, 395 F. Supp. at 681-82; Ludwig, 18 Wash. App. at 42-44, 567 P.2d at 663-64.
Most analysis of the question is in the context of seeking the most closely analogous
state statute of limitations in 10b-5 actions. Of course, such analysis is dispositive of
actions in many cases. For a brief discussion of this point, see Recent Decisions, Statutes
of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: White v. Sanders, 34 ALA. L. REv. 131 (1984).
124. See Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7, 10-11 (6th Cir. 1980) (failure to enact §
410(h), which proscribes implied remedies and limits plaintiffs' remedies to those expressly within § 410, indicates Kentucky Legislature's willingness to allow implied remedies under their blue sky law).
125. See S.C. Con ANN. § 35-1-1560 (1976).
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law doctrines of deceit, misrepresentation, and, in some respects,
breach of fiduciary duty.12 6 The federal wrong of securities fraud
is "superimposed" on these doctrines and common law is borrowed to provide the elements of the wrong and the available
remedies. 127 In view of the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws, "at the very least the most liberal common law
views" are borrowed for rule 10b-5, and in fact, securities fraud
is not limited to common law notions of fraud, in either federal
128
or state securities law.

If construed to provide comprehensive compensatory and
restitutionary remedies, this broadly interpreted federal cause of
action, which carries with it a considerably complex and ill-understood common law,129 would interfere considerably with related state-developed remedies. Adoption of this cause of action
seems contrary to a state's subjective interest in the consistency
of its actions and remedies. 130 The United States Supreme Court
has tried to avoid this result.1"' Does South Carolina wish to impose upon itself the very interference from which the Supreme
Court has attempted to spare it? Even if the answer might be
"yes," the Legislature is the appropritate body to resolve this
question.

126. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
supra note 5, at 799.
127. See, e.g., FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 5, at 812.

OF REMEDIES

§ 9.3, at 614-15;

FUNDAMENTALS,

128. Id. at 813.
129. See T. HAZEN, supra note 28, at 449, and sources cited therein. As Professor
Hazen notes, the elements authorities of a 10b-5 cause of action are "seriously in dispute
today." Id.
130. For example, the desired relationship between the elements of a South Carolina
civil action in securities fraud and those of the South Carolina common-law action for
deceit should be explored before the federal common law of deceit under rule 10b-5 is
adopted. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(d), 7B U.L.A. 578 (1958); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(4)
(1976) (" 'Fraud','deceit' and 'defraud' are not limited to common-law deceit.") (emphasis in original); COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 93 ("Section 401(d) codifies the holdings
that 'fraud' as used in federal and state securities statutes... is not limited to commonlaw deceit."); see also, e.g., Gold Kist, Inc. v. C & S Nat'l Bank, 286 S.C. 272, 279, 333
S.E.2d 67, 72 (1985); Elders v. Parker, 286 S.C. 228, 233-34, 332 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ct.
App. 1985).
131. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,
79-80 (1975) (criminal penalty for corporate malfeasance not necessarily preclude implied private cause of action, but must have statutory basis for implying civil action in
favor of plaintiff); Warren, supra note 20, at 507-09, and authority cited therein.
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b. Regulatory Versus Compensatory
The primary argument for borrowing federal jurisprudence
under rule 10b-5 is the absence of a civil remedy for sellers
under the SCUSA and the absence of any civil remedy for buyers other than rescission. If securities fraud is a wrong, should
there not be a remedy for those who can show injury?
The strongest rebuttal to this argument is that the United
States Supreme Court has held rule 10b-5 not to be principally
compensatory or restitutionary; as interpreted, it does not provide a comprehensive range of remedies to those affected by securities fraud. 132 The Court has permitted employment of the
private action under the rule only insofar as necessary to fulfill
the congressional purpose of complete and correct disclosure in
securities transactions and not as a general avenue to redress for
investors seeking to tie their injuries to securities fraud. 1 3 The
Court adheres to this regulatory interpretation of the rule while
acknowledging that substantial classes of injured investors are
left without an action under the rule. 3 If a cause of action supporting comprehensive remedies for securities fraud is desired in
addition to existing state law actions and remedies, the answer is
not the body of law that has developed under rule 10b-5.
B.

South Carolina Precedent

Two cases address the availability of an implied private civil
action under South Carolina Code section 35-1-1210. One of
these is unreported and in the other, the issue was not con3 5 an action
tested. In Carver v. Blanford,1
brought under the
SCUSA, a purchaser of 100% of the stock in the defendant's
business sought rescission under the SCUSA and also alleged
fraud. The supreme court thought it possible to interpret plaintiff/appellant Carver's complaint as alleging a private cause of

132. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The
recent trend of United States Supreme Court decisions has been one of "limiting the
remedies" available for implied civil actions under the federal securities laws. T. HAZEN,

supra note 28, at 439.
133. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), and authority cited therein.
134. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 758-59 (1975)

(Powell, J., concurring).
135. 288 S.C. 309, 342 S.E.2d 406 (1986).
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action for securities fraud under the SCUSA. The court noted,
however, that the appellant "admits that [Code section 35-11210] does not create a private cause of action." ' There was no
further discussion of that issue in the opinion.
In the unreported decision of Kitchens v. U.S. Shelter
Corp.,'"7 a federal district judge declined to dismiss a complaint
founded upon an implied action under section 35-1-1210. As for
South Carolina Code section 35-1-1560 (South Carolina's version
of Uniform Act section 410(h)) 3l

s

and its provision that "this

Chapter does not create any cause of action not specified in this
section or [section] 35-1-510,"'' 3 the court determined, "There is
no indication, under state law, that section 35-1-1560 was enacted to preclude private rights of action under the South Carolina Securities Act.

1 40

The district court in Kitchens considered arguments based
upon the commentary to the SCUSA as failing in light of South
Carolina case law which, in the words of the court, "makes clear
that the purpose of [section] 35-1-1560 was to insure that the
civil remedies set forth in the South Carolina Uniform Act are
14 1
properly joined with common law actions in fraud and deceit.

136. Id. at 311 n.2, 342 S.E.2d at 407 n.2.

137. 1984-85 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 91,838 (D.S.C. 1984). The complaint alleged
material omissions and misstatements in a registration statement and prospectus relating to the defendants' offer to the plaintiffs of an exchange of shares of stock in the
defendants' corporation for plaintiffs' interests in limited partnerships, so that the plaintiff was in effect a seller. See id.
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1560 (1976).
139. Id.
140. Kitchens, 1984-85 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
90,203-90,204.
141. Id. at 1 90,204. For this proposition, the court cited Bradley v. Hullander, 266
S.C. 188, 222 S.E.2d 283 (1976). Bradley was an action by purchasers against sellers of
shares of stock. The action was brought under the identical predecessor provision to S.C.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490 (1976), i.e., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-309 (1962) (express action for
rescission for buyers of securities), and common-law fraud. The defendants demurred,
arguing that the two causes could not properly be joined in a complaint because they
sought inconsistent remedies. The order denying the demurrer was appealed to the
South Carolina Supreme Court, which ruled that common-law fraud and a securities
fraud action for rescission could properly be joined. 266 S.C. at 195, 222 S.E.2d at 287. In
support of its ruling, the court quoted the following language from S.C. CODE ANN. § 62316 (1962), the identical predecessor provision to § 35-1-1560: "The rights and remedies
provided by this chapter are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist at
law or in equity, but this chapter does not create any cause of action not specified in this
section or § 62-111 ..... " 266 S.C. at 194, 222 S.E.2d at 287.
The legislature's purpose in enacting this provision, wrote the court, was "to provide
that the civil remedies set forth in the Act are in addition to all other causes of action or
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The opinion goes on to refer to the verbal similarities between
Code section 35-1-1210 and rule 10b-5 and the possibility of the
"development of implied remedies at the state level paralleling
that [sic] available under [r]ule 10b-5. '142 The Kitchens opinion
is correct that in light of section 35-1-1560 and the pronouncement of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Bradley v. Hullander,4 3 the SCUSA does not preempt existing state law reme-

dies. The further conclusions of the opinion, however, described
as "clear" by the court are rather opaque since foreclosure of
preemption cannot, in good sense, be read to be the only purpose of section 35-1-1560. In that case, what meaning are we to
give to the words: "[t]his Chapter does not create any cause of
action not specified . . .,?

The purpose of those words-to

prevent the implication of actions-is clear from their plain
meaning and from the draftsmen's comments and has been gen45

erally recognized.1

Alternatively, one can interpret the opinion to mean that
existing actions are available to redress harm flowing from section 35-1-1210 violations. If this is the true meaning of Kitchens,
then the references to rule 10b-5 are gratuitous. Reference to the
rule is not necessary to determine that if the-elements of an existing cause of action can be proven in a securities context, a
plaintiff may maintain the action. The nonpreemption clause of
section 35-1-1560 contains language to this effect. The "does not
create" clause of section 35-1-1560 means that while existing actions are not preempted, new actions are not to be founded on
section 35-1-1210 by implication.
Not only are the Kitchens ruling and its accompanying
dicta on shaky ground under the statute, they seem inappropriate on grounds of comity. The issues involved in effectively altering a statutory scheme by implying actions, with the possibility of borrowing the complex law of rule 10b-5, are far more
appropriate for resolution by the Legislature than by a federal
district court in a motion hearing. In a recent federal district
court case applying Georgia law, Friedlander v. Troutman,

remedies
142.
143.
144.
145.

at law or in equity." Id. at 195, 222 S.E.2d at 287.
Kitchens, 1984-85 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 11 90,203-90,204.
266 S.C. 188, 222 S.E.2d 283 (1976).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1560.
See authority cited supra note 123.
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Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore,146 the court declined to imply
14
a private right of action under Georgia's section 101 analogue 7
"[b]ecause a federal court should not determine so important an
issue of state law as a matter of first impression ....,,28
V.

CONCLUSION

Looking for guidance to the federal law in interpreting the
South Carolina Uniform Securities Act has advantages for the
State. It can also promote uniformity among the states and coordination with the federal scheme of securities regulation. State
courts and securities regulators, however, should pursue these
latter policies only insofar as they are not inconsistent with
State interests. In any event, borrowing should be used only after consideration of the similarities and differences in function
and purpose of the federal and State laws: "Looking for guidance" should not become borrowing without analysis. Finally,
the federal laws are not the only ones to which South Carolina
can look for guidance. Thirty-nine other jurisdictions have
adopted versions of the Uniform Act.1 49 Some of these adopting
jurisdictions have numerous recorded decisions interpreting the
Act. 150 The problems addressed in these decisions are often more
similar to those faced in South Carolina than are the problems
addressed under the federal securities laws, and their solutions
are informed by doctrines more closely related to those of South
Carolina.
If appropriate authorities determine that South Carolina
needs a private civil action to provide restitutionary and com146. 595 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ga. 1984); see also Diamond v. Lamotte, 709 F.2d 1419
(11th Cir. 1983). In Diamond the Eleventh Circuit was not faced with the issue of an
implied action, but noted that the Georgia § 101 analogue created no express action in
favor of sellers, when making a "most analogous action" analysis to determine a statute
of limitation applicable to rule 10b-5. Id. at 423. Federal courts that have been willing to
decide the issue have usually followed the wording of the statute and the intentions of
the draftsmen and declined to imply a cause of action. See authority cited supra note
123.
147. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-12 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
148. Friedlander,595 F. Supp. at 1452. The court added, "'Federal courts should
not be overeager to hold on to the determination of issues that might be more appropriate to settlement in state court litigation.'" (quoting Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427,
433 (1st Cir. 1949), quoted in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)).
149. See authority cited supra note 58.
150. See id.
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pensatory remedies for securities fraud injuries, such an action
should be developed giving due consideration to the nature of
causes of action and relationships between injury and relief
under current South Carolina law. If there is a need, it should be
addressed comprehensively with a view to complementing existing South Carolina jurisprudence, rather than reflexive borrowing and consequent superimposition of jurisprudence developed elsewhere.
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